The USV Annals of Economics and Public Administration, Vol 11, No 1

Font Size:  Small  Medium  Large

Wage levels and agency problems in professional team sports

José Manuel Sánchez Santos, José Atilano Pena López


This paper seeks to provide theoretical foundations to address the effects of the asymmetric information inherent to contractual relationships between teams and players in professional team sports. Particularly, a Shapiro-Stiglitz efficiency model version along with Rosen’s insight about superstars economics is used to show that in addition to the high demand (i.e. marginal productivity) is necessary to consider a moral hazard problem as a source or as an explanatory factor of the rigidity and inflation that characterize sport superstars wages. The importance attributed to this approach lies in the fact that taking the results of the analysis as a reference, some ways of reinforcing players observance of internal team norms, reducing the costs of supervision and some channels of capping the non-shirking remuneration can be proposed.

Full Text: PDF

                     Ştefan cel Mare University of Suceava                   Faculty of Economics, Administration and Business


Licenţa Creative Commons
The articles in this journal are licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License .

Since 2008. Maintained by Livius.