

## FOR THE SAKE OF DEVELOPMENT? MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT AND LOCAL DEVELOPMENT IN EMILIA-ROMAGNA AND TURIN (1945-1975)

Daniela ADORNI  
University of Turin, Italy  
daniela.adorni@unito.it  
Stefano MAGAGNOLI  
University of Parma, Italy  
stefano.magagnoli@unipr.it

### Abstract:

*This paper (1) examines two areas of Italy, with very different political subcultures and production systems, with the aim of making a comparative analysis of the role of local government policies in stimulating growth processes over the thirty-year post war period.*

*Historians now agree that the policies of Italian local governments were a major factor in the processes of economic growth and the spread of social services. They acted through a highly varied mix of policies, including regulatory processes (town planning, coordinated local programming, etc.), operations enabling institutions to provide the local environment with specific public goods (industrial estates, business services etc.) as well as redistribution policies (i.e. the setting up and spread of local welfare systems and local tax systems).*

*This influential steering role of local administrations, marked in some cases by the gradual inception of specific institutional authoritativeness, was not distributed uniformly over the whole of Italy and there were significant asymmetries between areas.*

*A comparative analysis is made of the "Emilia-Romagna model" of local government, controlled by an Italian Communist hegemony in a context of small and medium sized firms, and the model of the city of Turin, which was based on an industrial Ford model because of the presence of the Fiat factory. The two models are compared from the perspective of actors and their different interests. Our aim is to gauge the nature and intensity of the local institutional actions that accompanied and promoted the processes of development.*

**Key words:** development, municipal government, local development, Emilia-Romagna, Turin

**JEL Classification:** H10

## 1. THE "KIDNAPPED CITY": TURIN BETWEEN THE POST-WAR PERIOD AND ECONOMIC BOOM

### 1.1 A "VOCATION" THAT CAME FROM AFAR

After the loss of the historical role as the first capital of the Kingdom of Italy (2), Turin was required to "reinvent" itself and its future. It was the municipal authorities which found the way forward for a city that seemed destined for slow growth in population and employment through implementing policies to promote the city's new identity through science and industry. These policies created a new image of Turin as a city of production and trade and sealed its fame. They also entailed a cultural re-conversion which succeeded in taking not only the city but also the local political and administrative class from their somewhat comfortable revenues to an unprecedented industry which was expressed in planning capacity. The city's aim to adopt new economic and financial dynamism were immediately clear in the urban planning of the reconstruction of the historical city centre, which focused on hygiene, traffic and civic decorum. The determination also showed in urban planning regulations, especially that of 1912, which incorporated the inner suburbs where new industrial complexes were sited through the expansion of the city toll walls, and thus had the immediate effect of raising city revenues to be exploited for yet further re-conversion. Finally, the imprinting of the new dynamism could also be seen in the "Great Exhibitions", spectacular windows that showcased ongoing scientific and industrial developments, creating the image of fame in advance.

### 1.2 THE "FLIGHT INTO INDUSTRIALISATION" (3)

State industries were traditionally big employers in Turin. For example, Regia Manifattura Tabacchi, in the 1870s and 1880s, employed over 2,000 workers and on the eve of the First World War employed 1,500 workers. But between 1880 and 1890 the opening of new factories such as Ansaldo, Nebiolo, Ferriere Piemontesi and Elli Zerboni started a reversal of this trend. At the turn of the century, the Turin Council encouraged the development of new sectors such as the car industry (4) thanks in part to the injection of foreign capital, mainly Swiss and German. This favoured the role of Turin as *ville industrielle* (5), a role which it was to play right up to the 1970s.

The driving force of the city's industrial transformation was the hydroelectric industry (6). As early as 1906 (the year the Industrial League came into being) the metal and mechanical industries were the biggest in the secondary sector. The population of the area rose steadily in proportion with industrial development. In the first twenty years of the century, it increased by 50% mostly in the areas of the north-east of the city, those with the highest density of industries (7). Soaring demographic figures, alongside the growing influence of industry and industrialists in the political and social life of the city, gave a new role to the Council, which rapidly became a "great business at the service of the city's future" (8). Administrations from 1903 and 1909 endorsed the acceleration of infrastructure building, galvanising the new features of an industrial city. This endorsement was seen through the widespread recourse to credit, as well as freezing of debts and a financial manoeuvre aimed at increasing revenues. The central role taken at this stage by the technical offices of the Council was the sign of a dynamism in the institution underpinning the technical and prescriptive control of the city's transformation, which resulted in a greater visibility and a growing legitimisation of the administrative class.

### 1.3 FROM ONE WAR TO THE NEXT

The First World War brought big gains linked to war commissions for the textile, metal-mechanical and automobile sectors, but the Great Depression after 1929 brought about a rationalisation and caused problems for the trusts that had grown up, thanks to bold financial speculations which were disproportionate to their real development capacities. During the 1920s, there were four big industrial and financial empires that prospered – Fiat, Sip, Snia Viscosa and Italgas –, but the only one to escape unscathed from the Wall Street crash was Fiat, which reinforced its hegemony during the 1930s. In fact, the Turin Fascists, especially the Fascist appointed rector of Turin, Thaon di Revel, largely supported Fiat's demand in spite of their propaganda on breaking with the past and "anti-traditionalism" and in spite of the impracticability of their technocratic view of the city's future with a "glorious Fiat". Fiat was now well on its way to becoming the only real actor in the local context. The establishment of the car industry had, moreover, brought with it a sharp increase in the number of manual workers in the city (9). This caused housing and other social problems in the face of which the local elite and public authorities were unprepared and elusive, preferring to confine their activities more and more to administration and to pass policy issues on to central institutions (10).

The breakdown following the Armistice with the Allied Forces (8<sup>th</sup> September 1943) and the end of the Repubblica Sociale (April, 1945) only highlighted the inertia of the City authorities, which left Fiat room to exert an important role. It was able to consolidate its image as protector of citizens and emerge as a political entity with its own apparatus and own personnel. During the last years of war, in fact, the Fiat health service, run since the 1920s, took on a new role, playing for many working families an irreplaceable role in maintenance of minimum living conditions. In the spring of 1943, the range of benefits offered to employees was impressive. It included emergency medical aid after enemy raids, economic, legal and material support for victims, the supply of food and cleaning products in factory outlets and differentiated medical care for employees and workers (11). All this helped to validate the idea of the company as a part of community and transform it into a real institution which to a great extent "governed" the reconstruction of democratic Turin.

## 1.4 THE “ONE COMPANY TOWN”

After the war, it was obvious that Turin had been hit badly: 40% of housing had been affected and many public offices, workshops and industrial plants including Westinghouse, Lancia, Spa and various Fiat plants had been damaged or destroyed (12). There was a shortage of basic goods and no electricity. The cost of living was rising and hundreds of families were homeless. The housing crisis and the urgent need for the reconstruction of housing and production units were inevitably the first issues the new town council administration had to tackle. But past legacies weighed on their operational capacities. On the one hand, there was the survival of exchange mechanisms and reciprocal legitimisation between political and administrative personnel, now firmly ensconced in parties, and the self referential local elite. On the other hand, the city was overshadowed by the presence of Fiat. In the common imagination, Fiat was seen as the production system of Turin, its business trends exclusively responsible for city prosperity, and was identified with the very culture of the city.

Although reconstruction was undertaken with proposals for renewal and reappraisal of urban growth, the City Council, in the end, actually made provision for the needs of a city “that lived from day to day”. It dealt with the demands of the emergency and was never quite able to cope with the pressure of interests of reconstruction and city expansion (13). An indicator of these weaknesses was the long and complicated process of the new General Urban Planning Regulations which, drafted in 1945 by the Council Board nominated by the National Liberation Committee under the Communist, Roveda, was adopted by the City council on 7<sup>th</sup> April 1956 and became operative in December 1959 (14). This new urban plan was simply a modification of the existing one. But during its long gestation, alongside a mass transfer of approximately 40,000 square metres of land belonging to the City to private owners, the reconstruction of the city had taken place after all. It occurred in an ad hoc fashion thanks to the building dispensations granted and continuous amendments made to the old Regulations. Private initiatives (15) were often supported and unsightly illegal “blocks” sprang up even in the historical centre, with insufficient or inexistent infrastructures, insufficient social services and suburbs that lay abandoned and isolated (16).

None of the political groupings put forward policies for management of growth and change or indeed any alternative to the utopia of the “self-propelled development” of the “metallurgic city”. They were unable to meet the challenge of large-scale immigration from southern Italy (17) which inevitably brought about a drastic redefinition of the relationship between Turin and its urban area, on the one hand, and with the rest of the Italy on the other.

Totally inadequate when it came to policy planning, local authorities were reduced to being mere suppliers of bureaucratic and technical services and guarantors of social calm and order. The support of the left-wing juntas for building districts such as Mirafiori – built near the Fiat factory and aimed at solving the problems of workers because it removed travel expenses to work – posed the problem of the subordination of left-wing citizens to Fordism (18). The centre-party administrations, under Mayor Peyron, embodied the link between Fiat's economic management, in the person of Valletta, the managing director, and the political powerhouse of the local Christian Democrats, in the person of the right-wing Pella (19). The town hall was, at that time, void of real decisional powers and excluded from the power game between industry and the political and administrative class. Its task was limited to building and preserving "industrial citizenship". Evading basic political choices, it swung between services to business and representational activities. As "routine" tasks it approved compulsory spending, and as a "representational" activity it aimed to "restore an image to Turin that was worthy of its past" and at the same time, enhance its image as the "capital of labour" and a city that was the symbol of progress and development (20). The head of the Urban Planning Department, Radicioni, described the city in 1976 as "a giant infrastructure in the service of production", while Valletta's Turin (21) could be termed an "inert receptacle of company expansion" (22). The public face of Turin acted as a paradigm of the entire country, providing a focus for the optimism of the "economic miracle". During those years, Italy developed a democratic conscience still in its infancy although it was compelled to reckon with ever more critical imbalances. Poverty was systematically erased.

Protagonist of the start of this new phase was the Anselmetti junta (25). It aimed at carving out a space for the planning capabilities of the public actor based on technical competence. It approved a vast programme of public works, which among other objectives also aimed at promoting private motorisation. It planned "Greater Turin", a consortium with outlying councils presented by the mayor in 1962, and in view of an inter-Council Plan which combined private and public activities began to impose limits on private initiatives harmful to collective interests. It put forward proposals for the tertiarisation of Turin, which was a decision encouraged by private industry as they searched for premises for their offices in line with those of the banks and financial institutions. Anselmetti's proposals, however, continued to be hindered by the centre party majority which claimed they were simply following the wishes of private industry. Only the start of a centre-left (1966) administration, later than in other cities in Italy, promised to rescue Turin from stagnation. Mayor Grosso (26) shifted policies and development plans towards a regional and supra-regional scale and insisted that the order of the day was to "break with isolation". Projecting Turin as an important European city, he set out a plan for a bold redefinition of the public mission. In this plan, once operations supporting and integrating private interests were completed, they would be offset by the technical upgrading of some departments and a new mediation bridging the interests of the plurality of institutional and non-institutional interlocutors. The plan, however, was destined to failure because at this stage, industry began a "progressive retreat from being a political proxy" (27). This set the scene for a "divorce" between public and private as regards the management of the crisis and the distribution of its economic and social costs that would take place in the Seventies.

## 2.1 THE EMILIA-ROMAGNA REGION: AN UNUSUAL HISTORY

This political strategy combines long-term “ritual” linked to the myth of the Soviet Union (28) with pragmatic support to companies and an equitable redistribution of wealth through the creation of a capillary network of public services. It is this unusual strategy which underlies the region's development. After World War II Emilia-Romagna was transformed in a very short time from a relatively undeveloped agricultural region to one of the most advanced areas in Italy, with standard of wealth and well-being comparable to those of Europe's most prosperous regions.

One of the main unusual elements in Emilia-Romagna was the Fight for Liberation, which opposed Fascist and Nazi occupation with a civil war, supported by Anglo-American armies. This struggle, known as the Resistance, was fought mainly by communist groups and produced – in a framework which fully confirms the thesis of Douglass North (29) – an unprecedented social, political, institutional and cultural break with the past. As has been pointed out (30), the Fight for

The strategy of the communist partisans moved in this direction from the start of the final phase of the struggle in April 1945. This phase was not only an important military event concentrated in time and space, but also became a political process, both *long lasting* and geographically *widespread* (31). It led to the final break up of the institutional and political structures of the defeated Fascist regime. More generally, the struggle for liberation was the final act in the long “civil class war” that raged in Emilia-Romagna in the first half of the twentieth century. This class war included the struggles of farmhands in the first two decades of the century, the reaction of landlords and the spread of Fascism, and the first post-war decade, marked by deep-seated ideological and trade union conflict (32).

The political and military experience undergone by Emilia-Romagna communism was uncommon in Italy, and it provided the basis of the local government project for local society outlined in the following years. The communists, because of their commitment in the Fight for Liberation, became the most legitimate political force to take control of local institutions at the end of the war. In this they were supported by the great electoral victory obtained in the first local elections in 1946 (33). It was at this early post-war stage that they started to build alliances with other social actors. These were necessary to gain full political legitimacy (34), and were also required by the Anglo-Americans, supervisors of the process of democracy building in Italy. It was a legitimacy that needed to look for new strategic alliances (35), but that aimed – above all – to develop a local government strategy to face the challenges of post-war recovery, and realize the transformation of economic and social relations.


After the war in Emilia-Romagna the general situation was very difficult: houses and infrastructures had been damaged and destroyed (36), unemployment was high, food rations were low, and the critical situation was made worse by the “black market” (37). Agriculture was the most important sector of the economy, which was marked by structural backwardness and a low level of consumption. Local institutions operated in a challenging situation, characterized by poor living conditions and economic uncertainty (38).

So, during the first local government legislature (1946-1951), local administrations were unable to develop a broad strategy program. The main challenges for local institutions were to absorb unemployment, especially through public work schemes, provide subsidies and make emergency repairs to roads and buildings, as well as sewers and water pipes.

Fragmentation, weakness and delays were order of the day in local government policy. Nevertheless it was in this phase that the Emilia-Romagna communists outlined a long-term government project, which aimed at the general transformation of local society. The period 1945-1955 can thus be called a phase of “learning”, in which the communists facing emergency, “learned by doing”, and built the backbone of their strategy. This was thus based on both on pragmatism and ideology, without losing sight of the long-term goal: social change (39). It was an important turning-point. Over time the Communists brought out their objectives: improve the living conditions of the working class; modify the economic structures and the social dynamics; intensify their support of capitalist development. It was the *metamorphosis* of Emilia-Romagna communism, sanctioned in the first Regional Conference in 1959. In this way a party that was “against the system” turned into one that sought mediation with economic power and supported capitalist development.

201

democracy. The report of Secretary Fanti stressed two important and complementary aspects: development and prosperity. *Development* was to be pursued by policies to support enterprises; *prosperity* was to be pursued by an "universal system" of social services, to redistribute the benefits of economic growth to the people.



**Figure 1. Modena: local and national taxes, local cost and debt, deficit, 1951-1977. Index numbers.**

Source: Our elaborations of figures from the Chamber of Commerce of Modena (various years) and the Proceedings of the Municipal Council of Modena.

The Emilia-Romagna communist plan was therefore an overall plan to govern and renew local society. It aimed to support industrial development (small and medium enterprises); create an important network of local welfare (41); and make massive investment in training (particularly technical-professional training). Moreover, it made provision to balance asymmetries between town and country by land management policies. The financial resources to support this commitment came primarily from local taxation (42), but, over time, local governments were forced to cover increasing spending by debt (Figure 1; the data concern the town of Modena, but can be taken as a general trend).

## 2.4 THE SIXTIES: THE "EMILIA-ROMAGNA LABORATORY"

The goals of the communist strategy became clearer in this decade, when the "Emilia-Romagna laboratory" enjoyed maximum consensus and the ability to produce innovation in political technologies (43). This strategy involved the full commitment of local institutions to new economic and planning policies (44) and was based on authoritativeness facing post-war emergencies leading the transformation of the Emilia-Romagna economy (Table 1).

**Table 1. Emilia-Romagna: number of employees. Agriculture, industry and other activities, 1951-2001.**

Percentages are shown in the second line of each item

	1951	1961	1971	1981	1991	2001
Agriculture	866,000	593,000	341,000	244,000	190,000	
	100	68.5	39.4	28.2	21.9	

Industry (total)	269,129	457,997	580,067	723,127	711,301	721,301
	100	170.2	215.5	268.7	264.3	268.0
Manufacturing	208,616	355,354	463,243	586,133	582,602	571,651
	100	170.3	222.1	281.0	279.3	274.0
Trade	122,521	205,415	234,149	287,861	294,150	309,610
	100	167.7	191.1	234.9	240.1	252.7
Other activities	78,264	100,905	138,621	213,061	242,396	303,941
	100	128.9	177.1	272.2	309.7	388.4

Source: processing data Istat.

During the Seventies the “Emilia-Romagna model” reached full maturity. The economic system was highly developed, local welfare services reached maximum levels, consensus was stable, and social conflict was at its lowest, while the Communist Party enjoyed an undisputed leadership as gatherer of consensus and broker of interests. This model of government seemed to work very well, providing material and social prosperity standards which raised Emilia-Romagna to the levels of some German Länder and Scandinavian Socialdemocracies.

The experience of Emilia-Romagna communists (the Emilia-Romagna “constitutional radicals” (45)) attracted great interest in academic community. Many foreign scholars wanted to understand how institutions still linked to the Marxist paradigm and the Soviet planned model, were able to govern such a highly developed socially cohesive region in the shadow of Western capitalism. Classifying the characteristics of development policies implemented in Emilia-Romagna, they fall into four major categories:

- a) policies to create a supply system of public goods (46) (including industrial estates, business service centres, loan guarantee consortia, export consortia, etc..), to reduce entry barriers and support economic growth (47);
- b) policies to create a “coordination centre” to best manage public resources and reduce the level of uncertainty, thereby making development policies more efficacious;
- c) policies for training (elementary and technical-professional schools, universities), to raise human capital level, to support industrial development of the region (48);
- d) redistributive policies, to obtain a more equitable distribution of wealth and support demand by the working and middle classes (local welfare) (49).

An important feature in the supply of public goods to manufacturing was the setting up of industrial estates for factories and the establishment of service centres for businesses, with a focus on the processes of technical innovation (50). The creation of industrial estates in Emilia-Romagna was an important litmus test of the strategy to support development; clear empirical evidence of the leading role played by local institutions. This was an important trajectory of the economic and institutional history of Emilia-Romagna, and was found only in this region due to the peculiarities of the political-institutional model. It was not seen in Turin or other regions as described above.

To conclude, we can say that the political forces that governed Emilia-Romagna after World War Two implemented a political project intended to support economic growth. This strategy moved in two parallel and complementary directions: a) direct interventions to support enterprises; b) policies of social wealth redistribution.

It was a unique model of development, linked to the political profile of Emilia-Romagna communism. It was in fact more Keynesian than Marxist, believing that public institutions should drive market choices by specific institutional input. It was still a strategic vision that rejected the absolute autonomy of the market, and this, as part of the social system, was instead to be directed and “governed” by institutions which govern society.

### 3. EMILIA-ROMAGNA AND TURIN: TWO MODELS COMPARED



To conclude it is interesting to recall why we chose to compare the “Emilia-Romagna model” and the city of Turin.

The first aim was to compare the different styles of regulating social systems in areas marked by the presence of a deep rooted Communist Party but characterised by completely different productive structures. Emilia-Romagna was characterised by small and medium-sized enterprises; Turin by Fiat, the biggest Italian firm.

The second aim was to identify peculiarities of the “Piemonte model”. In the period under observation there was in fact little similarity between the two regions. 20th century changes in economical and political physiognomy of Emilia-Romagna were linear and “harmonic”, while the different areas of Piemonte, showing differences and imbalances, were closely affected by the growing importance of Fiat.

After the crisis of 1929, and even more so after the Second World War, Turin and its enterprises became the main element of the Piemonte economy and in some ways of the whole Italian economy, although without outweighing the agricultural and manufacturing vocations of other provinces. This was the result, on one hand, of a particular mix of “aggressiveness” and paternalism which characterised Fiat management, and, on the other hand of significant international aids for post-war recovery.

The Fiat model was strongly supported by institutional policies, and in the long run became closely identified with the very identity of Piemonte. Fiat had a strong influence on manufacturing in its allied industries all over the region, and overshadowed other important enterprises, such as Olivetti in Ivrea and Lavazza in Turin.

Another important point concerns the role played in our case-studies by political parties, particularly by the Communist Party.

Emilia-Romagna communist hegemony was strong and deep rooted, but dynamic at the same time, and was based on an innovative strategy of social and political alliances. In the early post-war years the local institutions governed by communists faced post-war emergencies with awareness. In the following years, the Emilia-Romagna communists “accepted” the capitalist model of development with the aim of social change, formulating a plan to drive local development. This plan contained support for small and medium-sized enterprises, the construction of an efficacious local welfare and the rebalance of asymmetries between towns and rural areas.

The case of Turin is very different. As in Emilia-Romagna, the Communist Party won the local elections in 1946. But in just five years it lost its political consensus and “delivered” the local government to the centre-right parties. From the early 1950s, the centre-right indulged private enterprise, particularly Fiat, in order to make changes in the urban fabric and build infrastructures.

The attempts to remove Turin from the influence of Fiat were few and ineffective, as were the attempts to turn Turin into a ‘European’ city no longer characterised only by heavy industry. Turin was almost completely taken over by the Fordist model of Fiat which dictated its rhythms, spaces and practically its identity.

The political authorities of the Province and Region followed the same policies when they openly followed the wishes of Corso Marconi (51), and when they supported the reconversion of manufacturing and diversification in order to model a polycentric area.

The communist component of Turin political authorities underlined for a long time the importance of big enterprises and employment. But there was no role for local institutions in programming, regulating and driving public policy, unlike the Emilia-Romagna model, where this role was clear. It was a role which characterised the post-war years, and which made Emilia-Romagna into an important political laboratory, known and recognised in Italy and overseas.

## ENDNOTES:

- (1) This contribution is the result of collective research carried out by the authors following a unified methodological framework. In particular, however, Daniela Adorni wrote the first section (*The “kidnapped City”: Turin between the post-war period and economic boom*) and Stefano Magagnoli the second (*The Emilia-Romagna model from emergency to political programming*).



- (2) Turin was the capital of Italy 1861-1865; subsequently the capital was moved to Florence (1865-1870) and then to Rome.
- (3) F. Barbano, *Torino, una città incompleta*, ed. E. Bruzzone, Milano, Angeli, 1992, p. 31.
- (4) Fiat was in fact founded in 1899.
- (5) This was the title of Pierre Gabert's classic study of the development and issues surrounding the industrial features of Turin (P. Gabert, *Turin ville industrielle. Étude de géographie économique et humaine*, Paris, Presse Universitaires de France, 1964).
- (6) The Società Anonima Elettricità Alta Italia (1896), the biggest joint-stock company in Italy which held the monopoly for the production and distribution of energy in Piemonte until 1907, was particularly important.
- (7) To satisfy the growing demand for affordable housing, in 1907, a consortium comprising the Council, the Cassa di Risparmio and the Istituto S. Paolo founded the Istituto Autonomo Case Popolari.
- (8) U. Levra, *Dalla città "decapitalizzata" alla città del Novecento*, in *Storia di Torino*, vol. 7, *Da capitale politica a capitale industriale (1864-1915)*, ed. U. Levra, Torino, Einaudi, 1999, p. CXLVII. This highlights how the composition of the town Council had changed reflecting access by the industrial and business middle class and of the organisational structure of new political protagonists, the Catholics and Socialists, which between 1895 and 1899 had taken Council seats.
- (9) The number of inhabitants rose from 415,667 in 1911 to 499,823 in 1921 and, despite the Fascist government's measures restricting urbanisation and migration, rose from 590,753 in 1931 to 715,674 in 1941.
- (10) V. Comoli Mandracchi, *Torino*, Roma-Bari, Laterza, 2003.
- (11) S. Musso, *La Fiat di Valletta. Impresa e lavoratori nella più grande concentrazione industriale d'Italia*, in *Storia di Torino*, vol. IX, *Gli anni della Repubblica*, ed. N. Tranfaglia, Torino, Einaudi, 1999, pp. 241-285. "The health service provided free medical and specialist assistance, even at home, emergency medical and obstetric services, hospital admittance, convalescent accommodation, medical equipment, pharmaceutical services [...]. Alongside health services, aid included economic support with health benefits in compliance with contract norms, benefits for births (for housewives), funeral benefits and economic aid for special cases" (ivi. p. 245). Health services also included five holiday camps for children, as well as nursery schools, training courses for youngsters between 15 and 17 and technical and pre-military preparation courses for various employees up to the age of 20.
- (12) Precisely, 231,591 private rooms in private houses and 10,363 premises used for industrial purposes were destroyed or damaged.
- (13) A. Sistri, *Dalla ricostruzione al "miracolo economico", cultura urbanistica e immagine della città*, in AA.VV., *Torino città viva: da capitale a metropoli, 1880-1980. Cento anni di vita cittadina: politica, economia, società, cultura*, vol. I, Torino, Centro Studi Piemontesi, 1980, pp. 355-371; A. Castagnoli, *Torino dalla ricostruzione agli anni Settanta*, Milano, Angeli, 1995.
- (14) The Council Board nominated by the National Liberation Committee was dissolved and in the local elections of November 1946 the left-wing alliance was victorious. A junta led by Negarville until 1948 and then by Coggiola, both exponents of the Communist party, was formed. In 1950, the Coggiola junta was brought down by a construction scandal involving the socialist councillor of public works, Casalini. The elections of 1951 saw the City government pass into the hands of the "democratic block" and, until 1962, the Christian Democrat mayor, Amedeo Peyron followed a policy of adherence to Fiat's dictates or wishes.
- (15) Big companies, especially Fiat, took part in the meetings of the urban planning executive committee often as a formality. But they often had planning departments incorporated into their organisational structure. An example was the Servizio di costruzioni Fiat or Fiat Construction Service (founded by the engineer, Vittorio Bonadé Bottino in 1937 when the main Mirafiori factory was built), later to become Construction and Plants Division, (today Fiat Engineering), whose activities went beyond production to include a real culture of project management capable of appreciably affecting the whole company. For details see Alessandro De Magistris, *L'urbanistica della grande trasformazione (1945-1980)* in *Storia di Torino*, vol. IX, *Gli anni della Repubblica*, Torino, Einaudi, 1999, pp. 191-238; D. Adorni, P. Soddu, *Una difficile ricostruzione: la vicenda del nuovo piano regolatore*, in *La città e lo sviluppo. Crescita e disordine a Torino (1945-1970)*, eds. F. Levi, B. Maida, Milano, Angeli, 2002, pp. 295-394).
- (16) See *Inchiesta sullo sviluppo della città* (An inquiry into the city's development) carried out by the "Gazzetta del Popolo" in May 1954 (cfr. D. Adorni, P. Soddu, *Una difficile ricostruzione*, cit., pp. 345 ss.).
- (17) The migrants came mostly from the south of Italy and, between 1951 to 1957, Turin grew from a population of 719,000 to 1,125,000, to become the third biggest 'southern' city of Italy, after Naples and Palermo (G. Fofi, *L'immigrazione meridionale a Torino*, Milano, Feltrinelli, 1964).
- (18) See D. Adorni, *Due passi avanti e uno indietro: la formazione di una cultura amministrativa nel Pci torinese (1945-1965)*, in *Alla ricerca della simmetria. Il Pci a Torino (1945/1991)*, ed. B. Maida, Torino, Rosenberg & Sellier, 2004, pp. 167-214. Note the longstanding administrative culture of the Turin Communist Party, which for a long time was entrenched in the interpretation of Turin as an "industrialist" city and the deep-rooted conviction of being able to govern the city by making the factory its base. This ideological conservatism was a serious encumbrance on the local communist leaders in their capacity to understand the causes and effects of the Italian "economic miracle" as well as the changes taking place in the profile of the Turin working class.

- (19) Amedeo Peyron was mayor of Turin from 1951 to 1962. For more on his work see D. Adorni, *Il ruolo dell'amministrazione locale*, in *Torino da capitale politica a capitale dell'industria. Il miracolo economico (1950-1970)*, eds. F. Levi, S. Musso, Torino, Archivio storico della Città di Torino, 2004, pp. 145-158.
- (20) An example was *Italia 61*, the national exhibition that took place in Turin in 1961 to celebrate the first one hundred years of Italian unification.
- (21) Vittorio Valletta, ousted in 1945 from Fiat management by the National Liberation Committee's Commission for Purging, which tracked those having past connections with the Fascist regime, returned to the company in 1946 as managing director and chairman, an appointment he held until 1966. Valletta's Fiat tended to occupy as much "social space" as was possible, and finally incorporated "all the work, social and reproductive roles it succeeded in absorbing within its own structures" (G. Berta, S. Chiamparino, *Lavoro industriale e azione politica*, in "Sisifo", 1986, n. 7, p. 18).
- (22) P. Bairati, *Valletta*, Torino, Utet, 1983, p. 362.
- (23) A. Bagnasco, *Torino. Un profilo sociologico*, Torino, Einaudi, 1986. The "simplicity" of the city lay in a social stratification which reflected the organisational model of Fiat. The structure was based not on the market but on the synoptic-rational logic of the car giant, and politics was not independent of economic powers.
- (24) In response to a return of the cycle of workers' demands and protests and, more especially, given the end of the favourable economic cycle towards the middle of the 1960s, Fiat reformulated its industrial plan. Due to the crisis of *gigantismo*, Fiat favoured a progressive process of organisational and territorial decentralisation to the Council areas surrounding the city, which included a downsizing of production sites.
- (25) For a bibliography on Giovanni Anselmetti, Mayor of Turin from 1962 to 1964, and a clear example of the overlaying of public and private interests, see F. Borio, *Gian Carlo Anselmetti*, in *I Sindaci della libertà. Torino dal 1945 ad oggi*, Torino, Eda, 1980, pp. 167-173.
- (26) On the work of Giuseppe Grosso see A. Castagnoli, *Le istituzioni locali e le classi dirigenti dal dopoguerra alla metà degli anni Ottanta*, in *Storia di Torino*, vol. IX, cit., pp. 115 ss.
- (27) M. Olagnero, *Il terziario tra risorse e progetti. Indicazioni e materiali per uno schema interpretativo ed una periodizzazione. Il caso di Torino*, in F. Barbano, F. Garelli, N. Negro, M. Olagnero, *Strutture della trasformazione. Torino 1945-1975*, Torino, Cassa di Risparmio di Torino, 1980, p. 467.
- (28) P.P. D'Atorre, *Nemici per la pelle: sogno americano e mito sovietico nell'Italia contemporanea*, Milano, Angeli, 1991.
- (29) D.C. North, *Istituzioni, cambiamento istituzionale, evoluzione dell'economia*, Bologna, il Mulino, 1994 (original edition *Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1990).
- (30) G. Quazza, *Resistenza e storia d'Italia. Problemi e ipotesi di ricerca*, Milano, Feltrinelli, 1976; C. Pavone, *Una guerra civile. Saggio storico sulla moralità nella Resistenza*, Torino, Bollati Boringhieri, 1991.
- (31) G. De Luna, *L'insurrezione nella Resistenza italiana*, in *L'insurrezione in Piemonte*, Milano, Angeli, 1987, pp. 67-68.
- (32) G. Crainz, *Padania. Il mondo dei braccianti dall'Ottocento alla fuga delle campagne*, Roma, Donzelli, 1994.
- (33) *Amministratori di provincia. Consiglieri, Assessori e Sindaci bolognesi dal 1946 al 1970: riflessioni e materiali*, eds. L. Baldissara, S. Magagnoli, Bologna, Istituto storico provinciale della Resistenza, 1992.
- (34) A. Stern, *Il processo di legittimazione politica a livello locale. Il Partito comunista nell'Italia nordorientale*, eds. D.L.M. Blackmer, S. Tarrow, *Il comunismo in Italia e in Francia*, Milano, Etas Libri, 1976 (original edition *Communism in Italy and France*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1975); D. Sassoon, *Togliatti e la via italiana al comunismo. Il Pci dal 1944 al 1964*, Torino, Einaudi, 1980.
- (35) See the speech by Palmiro Togliatti in Reggio Emilia in 1946: P. Togliatti, *Ceto medio e Emilia rossa*, in *Politica nazionale e Emilia rossa*, ed. L. Arbizzani, Roma, Editori Riuniti, 1974.
- (36) Bologna and Modena were the most badly affected cities; L. Baldissara, *Per una città più bella e più grande. Il governo municipale di Bologna negli anni della Ricostruzione (1945-1956)*, Bologna, il Mulino, 1994; S. Magagnoli, *Tra dopoguerra e ricostruzione. Le politiche amministrative del comune di Castel Maggiore (1946-1956)*, Modena, Mucchi, 1994; G. Muzzioli, *Modena*, Roma-Bari, Laterza, 1993.
- (37) M. Legnani, *Guerra e governo delle risorse. Strategie economiche e soggetti sociali nell'Italia 1940-1943*, in "Annali della Fondazione Luigi Micheletti", *L'Italia in guerra*, 1990-1991, n. 5.
- (38) *La ricostruzione in Emilia Romagna*, ed. P.P. D'Atorre, Parma, Pratiche editrice, 1980.
- (39) P.P. D'Atorre, *I comunisti in Emilia-Romagna nel secondo dopoguerra: un'ipotesi di lettura*, in *I comunisti in Emilia-Romagna, Documenti e materiali*, Bologna, Graficoop, 1981, ed. P.P. D'Atorre, p. 14.
- (40) *1ª Conferenza regionale del PCI*, Bologna 27-29 June 1959, Introduction and report by Guido Fanti, in *I comunisti in Emilia-Romagna*, cit., p. 133.
- (41) *Democrazia, cittadinanza e sviluppo economico. La costruzione del welfare state a Modena negli anni della Repubblica*, eds. S. Magagnoli, N.L. Sigman, P. Trionfini, Roma, Carocci, 2003.
- (42) Note that local institutions in Italy until 1972 could impose their own taxes; direct, indirect and property taxes. See S. Magagnoli, *La triangolazione della storia locale. Storia amministrativa, storia delle élites, storia urbana nell'Italia del Novecento*, in "Annali di storia moderna e contemporanea dell'Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore di Milano", 1998, 4, pp. 537-592.

- (43) On political innovation see M. Cammelli, *L'innovazione tra centro e periferia. Il caso di Bologna*, Bologna, il Mulino, 2004.
- (44) Comitato Regionale Emilia-Romagna del PCI, *Linee per una politica di programmazione*, cit., p. 173.
- (45) This is one of the best definitions of Emilia-Romagna post-war communist leadership; R.D. Putnam, *Politica e ideologia dei dirigenti comunisti italiani*, in "Il Mulino", 1974, n. 232, pp. 204-205.
- (46) A definition of public good is found in L. Boggio, G. Seravalli, *Lo sviluppo economico. Fatti, teorie, politiche*, Bologna, il Mulino, pp. 323-324.
- (47) These are policies which act on enterprises' structural weaknesses produced by their size, making explicit the benefits of agglomeration economies.
- (48) Many efforts were made to promote the spread of technical-professional schools in the leading sectors of the regional economy, and to create new university "poles".
- (49) These are policies which act on external factors to enterprises, which impact positively on production processes.
- (50) S. Magagnoli, *Arcipelaghi industriali. Le aree industriali attrezzate in Italia*, Torino, Rosenberg & Sellier, 2007.
- (51) Corso Marconi 10 was the official address of Fiat for 43 years, from 1954 to 1997.

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. F. Barbano, *Torino, una città incompleta*, ed. E. Bruzzone, Milano, Angeli, 1992, p. 31.
2. P. Gabert, *Turin ville industrielle. Étude de géographie économique et humaine*, Paris, Presse Universitaires de France, 1964).
3. V. Comoli Mandracci, *Torino*, Roma-Bari, Laterza, 2003.
4. S. Musso, *La Fiat di Valletta. Impresa e lavoratori nella più grande concentrazione industriale d'Italia*, in *Storia di Torino*, vol. IX, *Gli anni della Repubblica*, ed. N. Tranfaglia, Torino, Einaudi, 1999, pp. 241-285.
5. Alessandro De Magistris, *L'urbanistica della grande trasformazione (1945-1980)* in *Storia di Torino*, vol. IX, *Gli anni della Repubblica*, Torino, Einaudi, 1999, pp. 191-238;
6. D. Adorni, P. Soddu, *Una difficile ricostruzione: la vicenda del nuovo piano regolatore*, in *La città e lo sviluppo. Crescita e disordine a Torino (1945-1970)*, eds. F. Levi, B. Maida, Milano, Angeli, 2002, pp. 295-394).
7. D. Adorni, *Il ruolo dell'amministrazione locale*, in *Torino da capitale politica a capitale dell'industria. Il miracolo economico (1950-1970)*, ed.s F. Levi, S. Musso, Torino, Archivio storico della Città di Torino, 2004, pp. 145-158.
8. G. Berta, S. Chiamparino, *Lavoro industriale e azione politica*, in "Sisifo", 1986, n. 7, p. 18).
9. P. Bairati, *Valletta*, Torino, Utet, 1983, p. 362.
10. A. Bagnasco, *Torino. Un profilo sociologico*, Torino, Einaudi, 1986.
11. F. Borio, *Gian Carlo Anselmetti*, in *I Sindaci della libertà. Torino dal 1945 ad oggi*, Torino, Eda, 1980, pp. 167-173.
12. A. Castagnoli, *Le istituzioni locali e le classi dirigenti dal dopoguerra alla metà degli anni Ottanta*, in *Storia di Torino*, vol. IX, cit., pp. 115 ss.
13. M. Olagnero, *Il terziario tra risorse e progetti. Indicazioni e materiali per uno schema interpretativo ed una periodizzazione. Il caso di Torino*, in F. Barbano, F. Garelli, N. Negro, M. Olagnero, *Strutture della trasformazione. Torino 1945-1975*, Torino, Cassa di Risparmio di Torino, 1980, p. 467.
14. P.P. D'Attorre, *Nemici per la pelle: sogno americano e mito sovietico nell'Italia contemporanea*, Milano, Angeli, 1991.
15. D.C. North, *Istituzioni, cambiamento istituzionale, evoluzione dell'economia*, Bologna, il Mulino, 1994 (original edition *Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1990).
16. G. Quazza, *Resistenza e storia d'Italia. Problemi e ipotesi di ricerca*, Milano, Feltrinelli, 1976; C. Pavone, *Una guerra civile. Saggio storico sulla moralità nella Resistenza*, Torino, Bollati Boringhieri, 1991.

17. G. De Luna, *L'insurrezione nella Resistenza italiana*, in *L'insurrezione in Piemonte*, Milano, Angeli, 1987, pp. 67-68
18. G. Crainz, *Padania. Il mondo dei braccianti dall'Ottocento alla fuga delle campagne*, Roma, Donzelli, 1994.
19. A. Stern, *Il processo di legittimazione politica a livello locale. Il Partito comunista nell'Italia nordorientale*, eds. D.L.M. Blackmer, S. Tarrow, *Il comunismo in Italia e in Francia*, Milano, Etas Libri, 1976 (original edition *Communism in Italy and France*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1975); D. Sassoon, *Togliatti e la via italiana al comunismo. Il Pci dal 1944 al 1964*, Torino, Einaudi, 1980.
20. Palmiro Togliatti in Reggio Emilia in 1946: P. Togliatti, *Ceto medio e Emilia rossa*, in *Politica nazionale e Emilia rossa*, ed. L. Arbizzani, Roma, Editori Riuniti, 1974.
21. L. Baldissara, *Per una città più bella e più grande. Il governo municipale di Bologna negli anni della Ricostruzione (1945-1956)*, Bologna, il Mulino, 1994; S. Magagnoli, *Tra dopoguerra e ricostruzione. Le politiche amministrative del comune di Castel Maggiore (1946-1956)*, Modena, Mucchi, 1994; G. Muzzioli, *Modena*, Roma-Bari, Laterza, 1993.
22. M. Legnani, *Guerra e governo delle risorse. Strategie economiche e soggetti sociali nell'Italia 1940-1943*, in "Annali della Fondazione Luigi Micheletti", *L'Italia in guerra*, 1990-1991, n. 5.
23. R.D. Putnam, *Politica e ideologia dei dirigenti comunisti italiani*, in "Il Mulino", 1974, n. 232, pp. 204-205.
24. L. Boggio, G. Seravalli, *Lo sviluppo economico. Fatti, teorie, politiche*, Bologna, il Mulino, pp. 323-324.
25. S. Magagnoli, *Arcipelaghi industriali. Le aree industriali attrezzate in Italia*, Torino, Rosenberg & Sellier, 2007.